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ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrencies that are based on Proof-of-Work often rely on
special purpose hardware (ASICs) to perform mining operations
that secure the system.
We argue that ASICs have been mispriced by miners and sellers
that only consider their expected returns, and that in fact mining
hardware should be treated as a bundle of financial options, that
when exercised, convert electricity to virtual coins.
We provide a method of pricing ASICs based on this insight, and
compare the prices we derive to actual market prices. Contrary to
the widespread belief that ASICs are worth less if the cryptocur-
rency is highly volatile, we show the opposite effect: volatility
significantly increases value. Thus, if a coin’s volatility decreases,
some miners may leave, affecting security. To prevent this, we
suggest a new reward mechanism.
Finally we construct a portfolio of coins and bonds that provides
returns imitating an ASIC, and evaluate its behavior: historically,
realized revenues of such portfolios have significantly outperformed
ASICs, showing that indeed there is a mispricing of hardware, and
offering an alternative investment route for would-be miners.
1 INTRODUCTION
The cryptocurrency boom was heralded in 2008 with the arrival
of Bitcoin [Nakamoto 2008], which introduced the idea of a fully
decentralized and distributed currency to the mainstream. Bitcoin’s
consensus protocol relies primarily on miners, who utilize Proof-
of-work (PoW) to secure the currency from double spending at-
tacks. Miners in turn are rewarded for their work via a form of
computation-based lottery, yielding additional rewards the more
they compute on behalf of the system. The ability to earn rewards
from mining has led to an arms race in which miners have pur-
chased increasingly efficient hardware that computes Bitcoin’s PoW
faster and at ever lower costs [Bedford Taylor 2017]. Today’s mining
is mostly performed in large industrial scale mining farms hosting
many machines, each consisting of ASICs (Application Specific In-
tegrated Circuits) tailor-made for mining. The profits miners derive
from their activity are highly volatile as they depend on Bitcoin’s
fluctuating exchange rate, on the amount of competition from other
miners (see Figure 1), and on many other costs. To stay competi-
tive, miners purchase mining rigs in advance, and at a significant
capital expenditure. These volatile returns make mining a high-risk
investment and may indirectly hurt the cryptocurrency if fewer
miners are there to secure it.
A naïve approach to pricing mining hardware takes into ac-
count future expected costs and gains. We emphasize, that such ap-
proaches, even if they account for future valuations of the currency,
and for increases in mining competition, are inherently flawed. We
claim that ASICs are functionally equivalent to a bundle of options
Figure 1: Bitcoin’s annual volatility, exchange rate to USD
and global hash-rate, as functions of time.
that allow their owners to exchange electricity for coins at different
points in time.
Our main contributions in the paper are to correctly model the
economics of ASICs and to apply option pricing theory to price
them. We thus properly account for risk which significantly affects
the value of mining hardware.
We provide an algorithm that computes the value of an ASIC
given its performance (power consumption and hash-rate), and
market parameters such as the current exchange rate, volatility,
electricity prices, the block reward and more.
Finally, we construct an imitating portfolio which consists of
coins and bonds, and would ideally provide identical returns to
an ASIC, and review its performance. Looking back at historical
data, we find that our imitating portfolios out-perform physical
ASICs, even when accounting for the fees required for portfolio
maintenance.
A novel insight arising from ourwork is the importance of volatil-
ity for miner profitability. At first glance, it may seem that higher
volatility in rewards implies a higher risk for miners, which may
devalue mining machines, but in fact, we show that said machines
increase in value if the cryptocurrency is more volatile, as shown
for example in Figure 9. This is because, like with conventional
options, if the exchange rate plummets, the losses of miners are
bounded (they can always shut off their machines and avoid paying
for electricity), but if exchange rates increase steeply their gains
can be significant.
Anecdotal evidence suggests mining hardware is usually priced
without taking volatility into full consideration, thus the inherent
risk is ignored. Instead, the hardware’s expected returns are used;
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so, it is not surprising that our valuation method produces results
that are different from actual market prices, as shown in Figure 6.
Paper Structure. The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows: we begin by reviewing related work, and then present
additional background on mining and option pricing in Section 2.
We go on to define the precise model for ASICs in Section 3. We
present our results on the correct methods for pricing ASICs in
Section 4, deferring some of the proofs to Section 6. We then employ
our theoretical results to perform an empirical evaluation using
real-world price data in Section 5. We conclude with a discussion
on the implication of our results in Section 7.
1.1 Related Work
Several papers explore economic and game theoretic models of
mining, butmost focus on thewillingness of newminers to enter the
market based on expected returns, and usually consider equilibria in
a single shot interaction, e.g., [Arnosti and Weinberg 2018; Dimitri
2017]. [Dwivedi et al. 2019] consider a myopic Nash equilibrium in
a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market.
Other works such as [Hayes 2014, 2017] look at mining dynamics
in an economic setting where different cryptocurrencies (altcoins)
co-exist. An analysis of mining in a model where miner rewards
are based only on transaction fees and block rewards are negligible
is carried out in [Tsabary and Eyal 2018]. An equilibrium of miners
in a bounded horizon setting is explored in [Fiat et al. 2019] and
[Goren and Spiegelman 2019]. Both show that miners may in fact
gain by turning ASICs on and off repeatedly, taking advantage of
difficulty adjustments. An economic analysis of the security aspects
of Bitcoin is performed by [Budish 2018], arguing that when the
currency is under attack, the value of Bitcoin drops and mining
hardware loses value.
Unlike our work, in all of the above the risk inherent in exchange-
rate fluctuations and its affect on ASIC pricing is not addressed.
Mining pools, which are coalitions of miners who perform PoW
together in order to get a steadier revenue-flow, are very popu-
lar [Gervais et al. 2014]; thus, risk-aversion is believed to be wide-
spread among miners. Pools were examined from an economic
perspective by [Rosenfeld 2011; Salimitari et al. 2017; Schrijvers
et al. 2017], but those again neglected risk. An analysis that does
take risk into consideration appears in [Athey et al. 2016], where
the price of bitcoin (and not the price of ASICs) is modeled based
on user adoption and friction due to exchange-rate uncertainty.
Lastly, works in the vein of [Anish Dev 2014; Hanke 2016; Suresh
et al. 2018] attempt to improve mining performance, thereby also
increasing mining hardware value, but do not directly analyze said
value.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Additional Details on Mining
In Bitcoin, a block is considered valid only if its hash, interpreted
as a number, is under some target value. The hash function used
is SHA-256, as standardized by NIST. Currently, the best known
method for finding a low hash is to simply try many different pre-
images by brute force.
The target value is automatically set by the protocol in order
to adjust the difficulty of creating blocks to keep the creation rate
constant even when more computational power is added to the
network. Thus, the probability that a single miner will create a
block decreases if more hash-rate is competing against it.
To encourage the creation of valid blocks, i.e.mining, even in the
face of the ever-mounting computational effort required, Bitcoin
rewards miners by allowing the creator of a block to add a coinbase
transaction to it. This transaction creates money out of "thin-air"
and transfers it to an address specified by the miner, in addition to
other fees collected from each of the transactions included in the
block.
Single miners do not expect to find a block often, thus the ma-
jority of bitcoin mining is done in mining pools, where miners split
rewards from blocks they find jointly. For this reason, miners can
expect small and constant returns from mining over time, and our
model will rely on this fact.
2.2 Option Pricing
A European call-option is a form of contract involving two parties
and an underlying asset. By purchasing a call-option, the buyer re-
ceives from the seller the right to buy the asset at some agreed-upon
price, the strike price, at an agreed-upon future date, the expiration
date. As this is a right and not an obligation, the buyer need not
exercise it if deemed unprofitable. Specifically, it might be the case
that by the date of expiry the underlying asset’s price is lower than
the strike price, thus it is preferable to buy the underlying asset
directly and discard the option.
In 1973, Black and Scholes have published what is now called the
Black-Scholes model of option valuation [Black and Scholes 1973],
a seminal work using the no-arbitrage argument, which argues that
options should be priced such that no arbitrage possibility involving
the underlying asset exists.
Using option pricing as a foundation, various financial decisions
have been cast as options, for example the decision of whether to
delay or abandon a project [Dixit and Pindyck 1994], and even valu-
ing patents and patent protected research and development projects
[Schwartz 2004]. This technique is called real option valuation and
it underlies this work.
3 THE MODEL
Our model divides time into discrete mining opportunities (turns).
The model assumes a miner can either activate its hardware or
leave it off for the whole duration of a single turn t . If the ASIC has
a hash-rate of h hashes-per-second and the total hash-rate active
on the network excluding the ASIC is H (t), activation of the ASIC
allows the miner to receive a fraction hH (t )+h of the block-reward,
which is bt coins. This is a highly accurate approximation of the
reward a participant in a mining pool would receive [Rosenfeld
2011].
Denote the ASIC’s efficiency, measured in the Watt-hours re-
quired for the computation of a single mining opportunity, as φ,
and the cost of electricity as et , measured in dollars per Watt-hour.
To model hardware failures, assume the ASIC "decays" gradually.
We model this via a mortality distribution: letM(t) be the fraction
of ASICs that "remains" after t time units.
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Figure 2: Coin’s exchange rate as a multiplicative random
walk, with a start value of C0, a q probability to increase by
a factor of ∆, and a 1 − q probability to decrease by δ .
Following [Cox et al. 1979], we model the change in Bitcoin’s
exchange rate as a multiplicative random walk. We denote the
Bitcoin-to-USD exchange rate at turn t by Ct , the probability for
its value to rise to ∆Ct in the next turn by q, and to fall to δCt in
the next turn by 1 − q, resulting in the price tree shown in Figure 2.
While it may seem simplistic to assume that the price at every
time unit can either increase or decrease by a factor, using suffi-
ciently small time intervals yields a highly granular price model
for longer periods. Indeed, this distribution is commonly used in
finance to model the value of assets such as currencies and stocks.
Denote the annual interest rate in the economy as η > 0, and
let r = 1 + η. We assume 0 < δ < 1 < r < ∆, otherwise, risk-less
arbitrage opportunities emerge, which our model assumes do not
exist.
Definition 1 (The no-arbitrage assumption). The freemarket
adjusts asset prices such that it is impossible to outpace market gains
without exposure to more risk. If such an arbitrage opportunity arises,
market forces would quickly use it until a pricing equilibrium is found,
thus closing the opportunity.
We mainly deal with the following types of assets:
i. The underlying cryptocurrency.
ii. A mining opportunity, denoting its value as V (·).
iii. A risk-free asset. An asset with a future return which is
independent of the state of the world that is reached. Its mul-
tiplicative return is denoted as the risk-free rate. An example
of such an asset is a government-issued bond, the value of
which is denoted by B .
In addition, we will create portfolios holding combinations of
the above assets, and denote a portfolio’s value by Φ (·).
We assume that all these assets are traded with sufficient liquid-
ity, a clearly defined price and that it is possible to hold a “short”
position on each one of them (owing the asset to another party,
equivalent to holding a negative amount of it).
Pricing a Single Immediate Mining Opportunity. Owning an ASIC
gives the owner an option to activate it for each of the mining
opportunities available during its lifetime; thus an ASIC’s value is
exactly the sum of the values of all these opportunities. Therefore,
by pricing a single opportunity we can price an ASIC.
An opportunity is similar to a European call option - an ASIC’s
owner has the option of paying the electricity cost of activating the
ASIC for the duration of the opportunity (or, in option terminology,
pay the strike price), which is h · φ · et , and in return receive the
partial reward of hH (t )+h · bt ·Ct .
This opportunity can never be worth strictly less than zero, as a
miner is not obliged to turn on its ASIC. In total, the value at time
t of the t-th mining opportunity is:
V (t , t ,Ct ) ≜ max
(
h
H (t) + hbtCt − hφet , 0
)
(1)
This is the immediate value of an opportunity offered by the
ASIC. But, pricing a future opportunity is trickier, as the future
exchange-rate is unknown; this will be demonstrated by Example 1.
We shall denote the value of the t-th opportunity in relation to some
time k ≤ t , where the coin’s exchange rate at k isCk asV (t ,k,Ck ).
Total ASIC Value. Assumingwe have successfully evaluated ASIC
activation for a single turn, we can proceed to calculate the value
of an "entire" ASIC received at time s relative to t ≤ s:
VASIC (s, t ,Ct ) =
∞∑
t=s
M (t − s) ·V (t , t ,Ct ) (2)
Reception Delay. A method for evaluating an ASIC’s price could
allow us to estimate the potential decrease in price associated with
receiving hardware farther in the future.
Often, ASIC manufacturers are backlogged and either deliver
ASICs to customers in the "far" future, or charge a premium for
early deliveries. Assuming ASICs do not decay while in transit, the
loss of receiving the ASIC at time s ′ instead of s is:
VASIC
(
s ′, t ,Ct
) −VASIC (s, t ,Ct ) (3)
Example 1. A vendor offers the option of using its ASIC tomorrow
for a single round. The vendor assures that if the ASIC is turned on,
it will earn exactly 1 Bitcoin (henceforth denoted as BTC or B), and
will require $250 worth of electricity. To simplify the example, let the
multiplicative interest-rate r be 1.
For this toy example, assume bitcoin’s value starts at $400 today,
and will either double or halve tomorrowwith equal probability, giving
an expected exchange-rate of 12 · $200 + 12 · $800 = $500.
At a $200 rate, activating the ASIC will result in a loss of $50, as
$250 is paid and only $200 is received; thus, rational agents will not
activate the ASIC, and will lose nothing. On the other hand, if the rate
increases to $800, it is possible to earn $800− $250 = $550 by turning
the hardware on. In total, the expected return is 12 ·$0+ 12 ·$550 = $275.
It is tempting to say that this is the correct price for the option, but
such considerations do not take risk into account. In fact, the correct
price for the mining opportunity is $183 13 , as will be shown later.
To show why $275 is incorrect, note that this price creates an
arbitrage opportunity. Assume there is at least one rational buyer for
the opportunity, willing to pay $275. If so, that buyer will surely prefer
purchasing it for the lower price of $274! We can sell the opportunity
for the lower price without actually owning it, all the while promising
the buyer that no matter the world state the same exact profits will
be earned. Essentially, we are performing a short on the opportunity.
As summarized in Table 1, to fulfill the promise we will do the
following: immediately upon selling the opportunity we will borrow
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# Step Cash Debt Coins Opportunities
0 Start of day. $0 $0 0 0
1 Sell opportunity. $274 $0 0 −1
2 Borrow $183 13 . $457
1
3 $183
1
3 0 −1
3 Buy 1112 coins. $90
2
3 $183
1
3
11
12 −1
Table 1: Balance of all assets on the first day of Example 1.
Regarding step #1: when selling the opportunity we have a
−1 quantity of it, essentially performing a short (selling it
without actually owning it).
# Step Cash Debt Coins Opportunities
0 Start of day. $90 23 $183
1
3
11
12 −1
1 Get activation fee. $340 23 $183
1
3
11
12 −1
2 Pay loan back. $157 13 $0
11
12 −1
3 Buy 112 coins. $90
2
3 $0 1 −1
4 Pay buyer 1 coin. $90 23 $0 0 0
Table 2: Balance of all assets on the second day of Example 1,
if the exchange-rate has doubled. Regarding step #4: giving
the buyer 1 coin covers the short on the opportunity.
# Step Cash Debt Coins Opportunities
0 Start of day. $90 23 $183
1
3
11
12 0
1 Sell all coins. $274 $183 13 0 0
2 Pay loan back. $90 23 $0 0 0
Table 3: Balance of all assets on the second day of Exam-
ple 1, if the exchange-rate has halved. Note that there is a
0 amount of the opportunity at the start of the day because
a rational buyer will not choose to activate the ASIC, thus
our short on the opportunity is closed.
$183 13 from the bank, giving us a total of $183
1
3 + $274 = $457
1
3 . We
will buy 1112 BTC, which under the current exchange-rate are worth
11
12 ·$400 = $366 23 . After this, we remain with $457 13 −$366 23 = $90 23 ,
which we will pocket as a profit.
If the value of bitcoin goes up, our rational buyer will want to turn
on the (imaginary) ASIC and receive the promised 1 BTC reward in
exchange for the $250 activation fee, which is paid to us. We will use
the fee to pay back the loan, leaving us with $250 − $183 13 = $66 23 ,
exactly enough to buy 112 BTC, that together with our existing
11
12 BTC
can be given to the buyer as the mining reward, thus covering our
short. Note we have also paid back all debt, while our pocketed $90 23
profit was untouched, as shown in Table 2.
On the other hand, if the value goes down, the rational buyer will
not want to pay the activation fee as it is more expensive than the
1 BTC (= $200) profit; even if the buyer is interested in receiving a
single bitcoin, buying it on the free market is cheaper than activating
the ASIC. So, we have covered our short without having to pay the
mining reward. We will still need to repay our $183 13 debt, and luckily
our coins are worth exactly 1112 · $200 = $183 13 . Again, we keep our
pocketed profit. Table 3 presents all changes in our holdings.
Although we have started with no money, we have made a riskless
profit of $90 23 due to the incorrect pricing of the ASIC. In the rest
of the paper we show how to correctly price it, and prove that when
using our method no arbitrage opportunities arise.
4 RESULTS
In this section we tackle the problem presented in the previous
example more generally – pricing the t-th mining opportunity in
relation to turn t − 1. To do so, we shall borrow a technique from
option-pricing theory (as in [Black and Scholes 1973] and [Cox et al.
1979]) where in order to price a mining opportunity, a portfolio of
mining opportunities and coins is constructed and purchased at at
turn t − 1. The portfolio is crafted to yield identical valuations at
turn t regardless of the change in the exchange-rate (we do this
in Claim 1), and as such is termed a risk-free portfolio. Thus, its
exact value at turn t − 1 will be known by properly discounting
and accounting for the interest rate (We show this in Claim 2).
We consider a portfolio that consists of the t-th mining opportu-
nity and a short on (a yet to be chosen amount of) at−1 coins, thus
its value at turn t − 1 is:
Φ (t − 1) = V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) − at−1Ct−1 (4)
And at turn t :
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,Ct ) − at−1Ct (5)
Claim 1. A portfolio holding the t ’th mining opportunity and a
short on the following amount of coins:
at−1 =
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) −V (t , t ,δCt−1)
Ct−1 (∆ − δ )
Is a risk free-portfolio for the single turn between time t − 1, t , and its
value in all possible states at t is:
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − at−1∆Ct−1
The proof is given in Section 6; its main idea is that there is
one degree of freedom (choosing the short amount, at−1) and we
must satisfy an equation equating the value of the portfolio in both
possible world states, yielding the same return in both.
Now that we have a risk-free portfolio, we proceed to evaluate
its return, and use it to price the mining opportunity.
Claim 2. If no arbitrage opportunities exist, the multiplicative
return of holding the risk-free portfolio constructed in Claim 1 between
turns t − 1 and t is equal to the risk-free rate.
The proof is given in Section 6; briefly, every other possible return
is examined and shown to contradict the no-arbitrage assumption.
Just as in Example 1, we can make a risk-free profit whenever such
arbitrage opportunities arise.
We then end up with the following expression for pricing the
mining opportunity:
Corollary 1. The value of the t-th opportunity at t − 1 is:
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1)
r
+
+
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) −V (t , t ,δCt−1)
∆ − δ
(
1 − ∆
r
)
In the above expression, all factors are known and can be calculated
at time t − 1.
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The proof is given in Section 6. It consists of using the return of
the portfolio together with its values at turns t − 1 and t to extract
the value of the opportunity at t − 1.
For the sake of completeness, let us revisit the scenario in Exam-
ple 1 and derive the correct price for the opportunity, as implied by
Corollary 1.
Example 2. Surprisingly, the price given by Corollary 1 for the
mining opportunity presented in Example 1 is even lower than the
naïve estimate.
The immediate value of the mining opportunity if the exchange
rate has gone up is:
V (1, 1, 800) = max (1 · 800 − 250, 0) = $550 (6)
And for the down state it is:
V (1, 1, 200) = max (1 · 200 − 250, 0) = $0 (7)
When using the above with Corollary 1 we can obtain the value of
the opportunity at turn 0:
V (1, 0, 400) = 5501 +
550 − 0
2 − 12
(
1 − 21
)
= $18313
As the proof for Claim 2 shows, any price different than this one, for
example the naïve price, creates an arbitrage opportunity.
4.1 Pricing Relative to an Arbitrary Time
By extending the previous method, it is possible to evaluate the
t-th opportunity relative to any previous point in time k , as shown
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1:MiningOpportunityValue
Output :value of t-th opportunity at turn k .
for Ct ∈ {∆t−k ·Ck ,∆t−k−1 · δ ·Ck , . . . ,δ t−k ·Ck } do
V (t , t ,Ct ) ← h ·max
(
bt ·Ct
H (t )+h − φ · et , 0
)
end
for τ ∈ t − 1, . . . ,k do
for Cτ ∈ {∆τ ·Ck ,∆τ−1 · δ ·Ck , . . . ,∆ · δτ−1Ck ,δτ ·Ck }
do
aτ ← V (t,τ+1,∆ ·Cτ )−V (t,τ+1,δ ·Cτ )Cτ ·(∆−δ )
Φ (τ + 1) ← V (t ,τ + 1,∆ ·Cτ ) − aτ · ∆ ·Cτ
V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) ← aτ ·Cτ + Φ(τ+1)r
end
end
return V (t ,k,Ck )
The idea behind the algorithm is to apply the same methods
of Section 4 on every possible world-state, starting from turn t
and going back, one step at a time, until reaching k . We will now
proceed to explain the method in depth:
The random-walk describing the coin’s exchange rate for the
period between turns k and t forms a tree with root Ck and leaves
∆τ δ t−k−τCk , for every τ ∈ [0, t − k].
The leaves represent the trivial cases for evaluation, each one
of them corresponds to a possible world state at turn t and as the
opportunity expires at that turn, its value can be calculated directly
from the definition given in Equation 1.
Proceeding inductively, let τ ∈ [k, t − 1]. We will want to eval-
uate the opportunity at one of the vertices of the (τ − k)-th level,
assume it is Cτ . Note it points to exactly two vertices from level
(τ − k + 1), specifically ∆Cτ ,δCτ . The method laid down in Sec-
tion 4 suggests that given that the opportunity values for these two
vertices have already been calculated, the opportunity’s value at
Cτ ’s world-state can be obtained. Claim 3 covers this case.
Claim 3. Let τ < t . Given that the opportunity’s valuations at
τ + 1 are known, it is possible to evaluate V (t ,τ ,Cτ ), which is equal
to:
V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) = V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ )
r
+
+
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
∆ − δ
(
1 − ∆
r
)
The proof is given in Section 6; the result is achieved by using
the valuations at τ + 1 to create a risk-free portfolio at turn τ that
holds the t-th opportunity. The return of the portfolio at τ + 1 can
then be used to retrieve the value of the opportunity, similarly to
Corollary 1.
By applying Claim 3 on every vertex of the current level and
continuing in a dynamic manner to previous levels, it is possible to
reach our goal and finally derive the value at the root of the tree,
which corresponds to turn k .
Deriving a formula for the mining opportunity’s value. Looking
closely at the algorithm and performing the necessary substitutions,
one is able to derive an expression for the value of the t-th mining
opportunity.
Theorem 1. The value of the t-th mining opportunity at to turn
k < t is:
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
t−k∑
τ=τ0
(t−k
τ
)
γ τ↑(
−γ↓
)k+τ−t V (t , t ,∆τ δ t−k−τCk )
Where γ↓ =
1− ∆r
∆−δ , γ↑ = γ↓ +
1
r , and:
τ0 =

log
((
bt δ t−kCk
H (t )+h
)−1
φet
)
log
(
∆
δ
) 
The proof is given in Section 6. It involves recursively applying
Claim 3 on V (t ,k,Ck ) until reaching a sum that only includes
values of immediate opportunities. Then, the sum is shortened by
looking only at opportunities that have a value that is greater than
0.
Example 3. Assume that bitcoin’s exchange-rate can either double
or halve with an equal probability, with the random walk starting
from a value of $200 at turn 0. Extending the walk to two turns
produces the recombining tree depicted in Figure 3.
Assume the vendor from Example 1 offers you the option of using
its ASIC at the second turn for 10 minutes, under the same conditions
as before. By following Algorithm 1, the value of the opportunity at
each state can be calculated, as shown in Figure 4. The algorithm
proceeds as follows:
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$200
$400
$800 $200
$100
$50
0.5 0.5
Figure 3: Example 3’s equiprobable two turn random walk.
$ 5509
$ 5503
$550 $0
$0
$0
Figure 4: The value of Example 3’s mining opportunity at
each state, according to Algorithm 1.
We start from the leaves and evaluate the immediate value of the
opportunity at each one. At the leaf where the exchange-rate is $800,
the opportunity is worth $550. On the other hand, if the rate is either
$200 or $50, the opportunity is worth $0. We have determined the
value of the opportunity at all possible states of turn 2.
Now, by using Claim 3 on each of the two possible states at turn
1, we get that the value of the opportunity can be either $ 5503 (if the
exchange rate is $400) or $0 (if it is $100).
Finally, we take one step back and look at turn 0. By employing
Claim 3 again together with our previous results, we find that the
opportunity is worth $ 5509 at the first turn.
4.2 Imitating Portfolio
Buying physical mining hardware can sometimes entail difficulties:
cooling, storing and maintaining it is costly, and receiving ordered
ASICs promptly requires paying a hefty premium when there is
high demand.
Imitating an ASIC’s revenue using a portfolio that does not in-
clude the ASIC might be better – it can start to produce revenue
immediately, without waiting, and avoids the aforementioned ex-
penses. We show such a portfolio can be constructed using coins
and bonds.
The portfolio will imitate the t-th opportunity between turns
τ ,τ + 1, for τ < t . Denote by aτ ,Bτ the respective amount of coins
and risk-free bonds in the imitating portfolio at time τ . Thus, the
portfolio’s value at time τ is:
Φ (τ ) = Bτ + aτCτ (8)
And, at τ + 1 it is
Φ (τ + 1) = rBτ + aτCτ+1 (9)
Claim 4. Assuming there are no fees for trading bonds and coins, a
portfolio can be constructed at turn τ to be worth exactly the same as
the t-th mining-opportunity in all possible world-states at turn τ + 1:
Φ (τ + 1) = V (t ,τ + 1,Cτ+1). The portfolio is obtained by setting:
aτ =
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
Cτ (∆ − δ )
Bτ =
∆V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ) − δV (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ )
r (∆ − δ )
The proof is given in Section 6, and is similar to the proof of
Claim 1.
Claim 5. At turn τ , a portfolio constructed as in Claim 4 is worth
exactly the same as the t-th mining-opportunity:
Φ (τ ) = V (t ,τ ,Cτ )
The proof is given in Section 6; it relies on showing that at turn
τ the risk-free portfolio of Claim 3 is equal in value to Bτ . Then,
algebraic manipulations are made on the definitions of both the
risk-free portfolio and the portfolio of Claim 4 to conclude that the
claim holds.
Combining Claims 4 and 5 immediately gives the following:
Corollary 2. The portfolio constructed in Claim 4 is an imitating
portfolio for the t-th mining opportunity between turns τ , τ + 1,
meaning the portfolio is equal in value to the opportunity at both
turns.
Similarly to Section 4.1, the imitating portfolio can be evaluated
at multiple time periods by dynamically moving backwards in time.
The portfolio can change between turns, costing additional fees
to perform the necessary adjustments; these are included in the
empirical evaluation performed in Section 5.
Note that under the assumption that there are no fees, Claims 4
and 5 imply that at turn τ+1, selling the imitating portfolio for turns
τ ,τ + 1 generates enough money to buy the imitating portfolio for
turns τ + 1,τ + 2, meaning that after the initial investment is made,
no new influx of funds is required to adjust the portfolio between
turns. In addition, the initial purchase of the portfolio costs exactly
the same as the opportunity that it imitates.
Let us proceed by demonstrating how to use these results to
construct an imitating portfolio:
Example 4. Figure 5 shows the portfolios imitating the mining
opportunity offered in Example 3 for all possible world states. The
portfolios were constructed in the following manner:
First, evaluate the opportunity’s value at all the states, as in Ex-
ample 3. Next, apply Claim 4 on each possible state at turn 1. The
imitating portfolio for the state where the exchange-rate equals $400
is comprised of 550−0400·(2−0.5) =
11
12 coins, and
2·0−0.5·550
1·(2−0.5) = −$ 5503 worth
of bonds. On the other hand, if the exchange-rate is $100 then the
portfolio has 0−0100·(2−0.5) = 0 coins and
2·0−0.5·0
1·(2−0.5) = 0 bonds.
Now, we will construct an imitating portfolio for the first state; it
will hold
550
3 −0
200·(2−0.5) =
11
18 coins, and bonds valued at
2·0−0.5· 5503
1·(2−0.5) =
−$ 5509 .
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B 1118 ,−$ 5509
B 1112 ,−$ 5503
B0, $0 B0, $0
B0, $0
B0, $0
Figure 5: The imitating portfolio for each state of Example 4.
The portfolio is represented as a tuple, where the left num-
ber (prefixed by B) is the amount of coins, and the right num-
ber is the bonds’ value in USD (prefixed by $). The portfolios
should always be sold on the last turn, thus all final portfo-
lios hold no assets.
To show that these portfolios are indeed imitating, we will analyze
their returns on the final turn. If an imitating portfolio is sold on the
final turn, by construction its return should equal the one given by
the actual mining opportunity.
If the exchange-rate is $800, the portfolio we constructed is worth
800 · 1112 − 5503 = $550, thus selling it produces exactly the same profits
as the opportunity at this state. If the exchange-rate is $200, look at
the two possible cases: if the previous turn’s exchange-rate was $400,
our portfolio is comprised of 1112 coins and bonds worth −$ 5503 , thus
selling the portfolio results in a profit of 400 · 1112 − 5503 = $0, again
equal to the opportunity’s. Conversely, if the previous rate was $100,
our portfolio holds no assets, so there is nothing to sell - and as before,
the profit is $0, the same as the opportunity’s.
5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We now turn to employ our analysis on real world data, deriving
prices for an ASIC, specifically the Bitmain Antminer S9, a single
hardware platform that has dominated the ASIC market for an
extended period of time, and has lately been replaced. We compare
these prices to historical market prices.
ASIC prices and specifications (hash-rate and power consump-
tion) are taken from Amazon. We assumed ASICs have a 2-year
expected lifetime; in fact, hash-rate considerations usually imply
that their profits vanish even faster.
For the following evaluations, the annual interest rate in the
economy was set to 2%, and electricity cost to $0.035, consistent
with reported prices that large miners pay. We assume that mining
pool fees are 2%, and bond and BTC-to-USD trading fees are 1%
each.
The BTC-to-USD exchange-rate and global hash-rate were taken
from blockchain.com. Volatility was evaluated according to all his-
torical data points starting at 2013 and ending at the value esti-
mation date, and future global hash-rate growth was evaluated
according to the 2 year window preceding the estimation date.
Volatility is the standard deviation of log-returns, and the hash-
rate’s growth was assumed to be exponential (which fits historical
data well according to the literature [Bowden et al. 2018]).
Estimation of ∆,δ . The estimation of the random-walk’s multi-
plicative factors is outside the scope of this paper, and was done
using the same method presented in [Cox et al. 1979].
Denote the annual volatility of the coin’s exchange-rate by σ ,
and byn the actual ("calendar") time until the mining opportunity to
evaluate. Assuming that there are t turns until n, the multiplicative
factors are:
∆ = exp
(
σ
√
n
t
)
(10)
δ = exp
(
−σ
√
n
t
)
(11)
All code used to generate our results is available at <Removed
due to blind review>.
Value Comparison. Figure 6 compares ASIC valuations obtained
by ourmethod to the historical Amazon prices of Bitmain’s Antminer
S9, and to a naïve evaluation method anecdotally used by miners.
In addition, the total cost of an imitating portfolio, including the
average-case fees paid for all necessary adjustments, is shown (la-
beled "Imitating").
The naïve evaluation method assumes that the future BTC-USD
exchange-rate will continue its recent rate of growth (labeled “Ex-
pected” in the figure). This corresponds to an evaluation that ignores
risk and uses only expected values, as shown in Example 1.
The figure shows that Amazon prices for hardware are closer
to the value obtained using the fixed-growth assumption, and are
higher than our estimate, suggesting that they do not fully account
for risk.
Figure 6: ASIC value according to different valuation meth-
ods.
Revenue Comparison. An imitating portfolio’s accuracy increases
with the granularity of its time-steps. On the other hand, portfolio
adjustments which are made at every such step potentially increase
its cost.
Figure 7 compares the realized revenue obtained from investing
$1, 000 in an imitating portfolio with an equivalent investment in
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real mining hardware that is received and activated immediately
after the investment was made, which is far from the typical case as
usuallyminerswait a long time to receive hardware. The revenue for
both is after deducting all maintenance costs, meaning electricity for
ASICs and cryptocurrency and bond trading fees for the portfolio.
The imitating portfolio allows each mining opportunity 25 portfolio
adjustments, which empirically produces accurate results.
Figure 8 aggregates realized revenue and initial costs of ASICs
and the corresponding imitating portfolios, constructed according
to our method. As before, the revenue for both is after deducting all
maintenance costs. The figure shows that in recent history imitating
portfolios produce higher revenues than ASICs. The reason our
imitating portfolio’s revenue is not exactly the same as an ASIC’s is
that there is a gap between the realized and projected growth rates
of the network’s total mining power.
(a) ASIC and portfolio revenue if purchased on July 2016
(b) ASIC and portfolio revenue if purchased on June 2017
Figure 7: Realized revenues (minusmaintenance costs) of an
ASIC and the corresponding imitating portfolio bought for
an initial sumof $1000 and received at the same time, as func-
tions of time.
The Effect of Volatility. As intuitively explained in Section 1, Bit-
coin’s volatility starkly affects miner revenue, and thus also should
affect an ASIC’s price. Figure 9 depicts our method’s evaluation of
ASIC prices as functions of volatility, where each line represents a
different purchase date. Bitcoin’s annual volatility, as estimated on
December 21st, 2019, and its peak annual volatility, which occurred
in the year preceding April 29th, 2018, are depicted as vertical lines.
As can be seen, our method gives higher prices for ASICs if the
annual volatility is higher. For example, an ASIC bought on June
2019 could have cost %16 more if the volatility was at its historical
peak.
The Effect of Reception Delay. Applying Equation 3 on historical
data from specific periods of Bitcoin’s short-term history, we learn
that even a brief delay in the reception of an ASIC can severely
decrease its value; for example, a month’s delay can decrease value
by 30%, as seen in Figure 10.
Figure 8: Realized revenue (minus maintenance costs) and
initial cost for a 2-year operation of an ASIC and the corre-
sponding imitating portfolio, as functions of the purchase
date. An ASIC’s initial cost is its Amazon price, and the port-
folio’s is the initial sum of money required for buying the
portfolio.
Figure 9: The increase in an ASIC’s value, in percent, as a
function of volatility.
6 PROOFS
Proof of Claim 1. There are only two possible future world
states: one where the coin’s exchange-rate will up relative to t − 1
and will be ∆Ct−1, and the other where it will go down to δCt−1.
Denote the immediate value of the mining opportunity in the up
state as:
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) = max
(
hbt∆Ct−1
H (t) + h − hφet , 0
)
(12)
And of the down state as:
V (t , t ,δCt−1) = max
(
hbtδCt−1
H (t) + h − hφet , 0
)
(13)
Given that t is in the future, our model assumes that there is
some estimation for H (t); Section 5 elaborates on the way such
estimates were made. Thus, the sole difficulty in evaluating Φ (t) is
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Figure 10: The decrease in an ASIC’s value, in percent, as a
function of delay.
that although at t − 1 we know what the value ofCt−1 is, we do not
yet know the realization ofCt . To circumvent this, we will construct
the portfolio such that its value at t will be the same no matter if
Ct is equal to ∆Ct−1 or δCt−1, yielding a risk-free portfolio.
The portfolio’s value at the up-state is:
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − at−1∆Ct−1 (14)
And, at the down-state:
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,δCt−1) − at−1δCt−1 (15)
So, we require that the following property would hold:
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − at−1∆Ct−1 = V (t , t ,δCt−1) − at−1δCt−1 (16)
Everything but at−1 is known, thus it is possible to derive at−1 by
isolating it, producing the following short amount:
at−1 =
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) −V (t , t ,δCt−1)
Ct−1 (∆ − δ ) (17)
Note that there is no probability in the equation, meaning that this
shorting strategy is not dependent on the probability of an upward
or downward change in the coin’s price.
From Equations 14, 15, 16 we get that by performing this short,
our portfolio’s value at turn t is equal to:
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − at−1∆Ct−1 (18)
The equation holds in all possible world state, so the portfolio is
indeed risk-free. By substituting for the short amount the following
explicit form is obtained:
Φ (t) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) −V (t , t ,δCt−1)
∆ − δ ∆ (19)
□
Proof of Claim 2. The proof mainly relies on the no-arbitrage
assumption. First, we will define the multiplicative return of our
portfolio between t − 1 and t as:
ρ (t) ≜ Φ (t)
Φ (t − 1) (20)
Thus, we want to prove that ρ (t) = r . Assume by contradiction
that ρ (t) , r . We will now show how to make risk-free profit in
every world state by dividing to cases:
Case 1. If Φ (t − 1) > 0.
Make a further sub-division to two sub-cases:
Case 1.a. If ρ (t) > r .
It is possible to "make money out of nothing" by borrowing
enough money at the risk-free rate to buy the portfolio at time t −1,
and selling it after a single turn.
Buying the portfolio is simply purchasing the mining oppor-
tunity and shorting the coins as specified by the portfolio, and
selling it is the "reverse" - selling the opportunity and delivering the
shorted asset. A reminder: shorting an asset means borrowing it
and immediately selling it, thus the same asset should be returned
to the loaner.
Borrowing at the risk-free rate means that there is interest to
be paid for the loan, but as this case assumes that the return of the
portfolio is higher, a profit has been made even after taking interest
into account, a contradiction to the no-arbitrage assumption.
Case 1.b. If ρ (t) < r .
Risk-less profit can be made by shorting the portfolio and invest-
ing the resulting money in a risk-free instrument at time t − 1, and
by returning the short at the next turn.
Shorting the portfolio entails shorting the mining opportunity
and buying the coins, as specified by the portfolio. Returning this
short is simply returning the mining opportunity and selling the
coins.
By the current case’s assumption, the return on the coins and risk-
free investment is large enough make a profit, even after delivering
the short, and we have reached a contradiction.
Case 2. If Φ (t − 1) = 0.
ρ (t) is undefined, thus a split to different cases than before is
required:
Case 2.a. If Φ (t) > 0.
Buy the portfolio at turn t − 1. According to the assumption
of the current case, at t − 1 the portfolio is priced at 0, meaning
that shorting the required number of coins as specified in Claim 1
produces exactly enough money to buy the mining opportunity.
By selling the portfolio after a single turn, a risk-less profit can be
made, as according to our assumptions: Φ (t) > 0 = Φ (t − 1).
Case 2.b. If Φ (t) < 0.
Short the portfolio at turn t − 1 and return it after a single turn.
Combining this case’s assumptions we get:
Φ (t − 1) = 0 > Φ (t) (21)
After a single turn the portfolio has made a loss; thus the short has
made a profit, which is again risk-less.
Case 2.c. If Φ (t) = 0.
From our assumptions we get:
Φ (t) = 0 = rΦ (t − 1) (22)
Case 3. If Φ (t − 1) < 0.
Proceeding as in Case 1.:
Case 3.a. If ρ (t) > r .
Borrow enough money at the risk-free rate to short the portfolio
(this costs money in the current world state). After a single turn,
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return the short, receive −Φ (t), and pay back −rΦ (t − 1) to repay
the loan.
As r > 1, we get that ρ (t) > r > 1, thus from our assumption
that Φ (t − 1) < 0 and from the return’s definition in Equation 20:
Φ (t) = ρ (t)Φ (t − 1) < rΦ (t − 1) < Φ (t − 1) < 0 (23)
Conversely:
− Φ (t) = −ρ (t)Φ (t − 1) > −rΦ (t − 1) > −Φ (t − 1) > 0 (24)
Meaning that a risk-less profit has been made.
Case 3.b. If 0 ≤ ρ (t) < r .
Buy the portfolio at the first turn. As the portfolio cost is negative,
buying it generates money; invest it at the risk-free rate for a single
turn.
At the next turn, sell the portfolio. This costs a positive amount,
according to the current world state, specifically−Φ (t). From the as-
sumptions and the definition of the return as given by Equation 20:
rΦ (t − 1) < ρ (t)Φ (t − 1) = Φ (t) ≤ 0 (25)
So:
− rΦ (t − 1) > −ρ (t)Φ (t − 1) = −Φ (t) ≥ 0 (26)
−Φ (t) was lost by selling the portfolio, but the risk-free invest-
ment is worth −rΦ (t − 1), enough to make a profit even after sell-
ing.
Case 3.c. If ρ (t) < 0.
As before, by buying the portfolio at the beginning, money is
earned, and it can be invested at the risk-free rate. By the next turn,
the portfolio is already worth a positive amount of money, thus
selling it earns even more money. So, a risk-free profit was made.
All in all, if the return of the portfolio is not exactly the risk-free
rate, there is an arbitrage opportunity and it is possible to make a
sure profit in every world state, in contradiction to the no-arbitrage
assumption; thus, the return has to equal the risk-free rate. □
Proof of Corollary 1. According to Claim 2:
Φ (t) = rΦ (t − 1) (27)
Rearranging we get:
Φ (t − 1) = Φ (t)
r
(28)
Substituting by the definition of Φ (t − 1) given in Equation 4:
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) − at−1Ct−1 = Φ (t)
r
(29)
We are interested in V (t , t − 1,Ct−1), so we will isolate it:
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) = at−1Ct−1 + Φ (t)
r
(30)
By using Equation 18 to substitute for Φ (t):
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) = at−1Ct−1+
+
1
r
(V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) − at−1∆Ct−1) (31)
Slightly rearranging:
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) = at−1Ct−1
(
1 − ∆
r
)
+
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1)
r
(32)
Finally, substituting for at−1 as given in Claim 1, an explicit form
is reached:
V (t , t − 1,Ct−1) = V (t , t ,∆Ct−1)
r
+
V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) −V (t , t ,δCt−1)
∆ − δ
(
1 − ∆
r
)
(33)
Note that all factors are known and can be calculated at time
t − 1. Specifically,V (t , t ,∆Ct−1) andV (t , t ,δCt−1) can be obtained
by substituting for the correct exchange-rate in the definition given
in Equation 1. □
Proof of Claim 3. At turn τ it seems the uncertainty regarding
the coin’s exchange rate at turn t is larger because there are t −τ +1
possible "final" future values instead of only 2, as shown in Figure 2
for the case where t = 2.
But, luckily, we are given V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) ,V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ). We
will use both values to construct a risk-free portfolio such that its
value at τ +1will be the same no matter if the exchange-rate will go
up or down. Similarly to Claim 1, it will hold the t-th opportunity,
and a short on aτ coins.
At turn τ + 1 the portfolio’s value is defined by:
Φ (τ ) = V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) − aτCτ (34)
And at τ + 1 it is:
Φ (τ + 1) = V (t ,τ + 1,Cτ+1) − aτCτ+1 (35)
If the coin’s exchange-rate has moved upwards between τ ,τ + 1,
the portfolio will be worth:
Φ (τ + 1) = V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) − aτ ∆Cτ (36)
Similarly for the down-state:
Φ (τ + 1) = V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ) − aτ δCτ (37)
So, to make it risk-free the following property should hold:
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) − aτ ∆Cτ = V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ) − aτ δCτ (38)
Solving for aτ gives the following short:
aτ =
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
Cτ (∆ − δ ) (39)
In exactly the same manner as in the proof for Claim 2, the return
of the portfolio at turn τ + 1 is equal to r :
Φ (τ + 1) = rΦ (τ ) (40)
Thus, by employing similar reasoning to Corollary 1 it is possible
to derive the result:
V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) = V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ )
r
+
+
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
∆ − δ
(
1 − ∆
r
)
(41)
□
Proof for Theorem 1. Let k < t . We will start by applying
Claim 3 on V (t ,k,Ck ):
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
V (t ,k + 1,∆Ck )
r
+
+
V (t ,k + 1,∆Ck ) −V (t ,k + 1,δCk )
∆ − δ
(
1 − ∆
r
)
(42)
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Note thatV (t ,k + 1,∆Ck ) appears in multiple places, by gathering
all occurrences we get:
V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) =
(
1 − ∆r
∆ − δ +
1
r
)
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ )
−
(
1 − ∆r
∆ − δ
)
V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
(43)
Denote γ↓ =
1− ∆r
∆−δ , and γ↑ = γ↓ +
1
r . So:
V (t ,k,Ck ) = γ↑V (t ,k + 1,∆Ck ) − γ↓V (t ,k + 1,δCk ) (44)
The opportunity’s value is now represented as a recursive formula.
Let us repeat the previous steps recursively onV (t ,k + 1,∆Ck ) and
V (t ,k + 1,δCk ):
V (t ,k,Ck ) = γ↑
(
γ↑V
(
t ,k + 2,∆2Ck
)
− γ↓V (t ,k + 2,δ∆Ck )
)
− γ↓
(
γ↑V (t ,k + 2,∆δCk ) − γ↓V
(
t ,k + 2,δ2Ck
))
(45)
Note that V (t ,k + 2,δ∆Ck ) and V (t ,k + 2,∆δCk ) are equal, so:
V (t ,k,Ck ) = γ 2↑V
(
t ,k + 2,∆2Ck
)
− 2γ↑γ↓V (t ,k + 2,∆δCk )
+ γ 2↓V
(
t ,k + 2,δ2Ck
)
(46)
We can inductively continue with the recursion until reaching the
exercise time of the opportunity, resulting in:
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
=
t−k∑
τ=0
(
t − k
τ
)
γ τ↑
(
−γ↓
)t−k−τ
V
(
t , t ,∆τ δ t−k−τCk
) (47)
Slightly rearranging:
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
t−k∑
τ=0
(t−k
τ
)
γ τ↑(
−γ↓
)k+τ−t V (t , t ,∆τ δ t−k−τCk ) (48)
Note that the sum potentially goes over states where the oppor-
tunity’s value is equal to zero, which is unnecessary. This can be
avoided by starting the summation only from τ where:
V
(
t , t ,∆τ δ t−k−τCk
)
> 0 (49)
By the definition given in Equation 1 this is the same as requiring:
max
(
hbt∆
τ δ t−k−τCk
H (t) + h − hφet , 0
)
> 0 (50)
As the opportunity’s value is strictly greater than 0, the max can
be dropped, resulting in:
btδ
t−kCk
H (t) + h
(
∆
δ
)τ
> φet (51)
By isolating τ we can find the minimal turn where this condition is
held. First, let us isolate ∆δ :(
∆
δ
)τ
>
φet(
bt δ t−kCk
H (t )+h
) = (btδ t−kCk
H (t) + h
)−1
· φet (52)
Now, take the logarithm of both sides:
τ · log
(
∆
δ
)
> log ©­«
(
btδ
t−kCk
H (t) + h
)−1
φet
ª®¬ (53)
Finally, we can isolate τ :
τ >
log
((
bt δ t−kCk
H (t )+h
)−1
φet
)
log
(
∆
δ
) (54)
So, the minimal turn for which the opportunity’s value is greater
than 0 is:
τ0 ≜

log
((
bt δ t−kCk
H (t )+h
)−1
φet
)
log
(
∆
δ
)  (55)
Starting the summation from τ0 gives the following equation:
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
t−k∑
τ=τ0
(t−k
τ
)
γ τ↑(
−γ↓
)k+τ−t V (t , t ,∆τ δ t−k−τCk ) (56)
As noted before, thanks to summing only strictly positive values it
is possible to drop the max, resulting in the following equation:
V (t ,k,Ck ) =
t−k∑
τ=τ0
(t−k
τ
) (
γ↑
)τ
h(
−γ↓
)k+τ−t
(
btCkδ
t−k
H (t) + h
(
∆
δ
)τ
− φet
)
(57)
□
Proof of Claim 4. This is done similarly to the proof of Claim 1.
We want the portfolio to be worth the same as the underlying asset
in the next turn, no matter the realization of the coin’s exchange-
rate.
If the exchange-rate has went up, the portfolio’s value is:
Φ (τ + 1) = rBτ + aτ ∆Cτ (58)
If it went down, the value is:
Φ (τ + 1) = rBτ + aτ δCτ (59)
So, to find the correct values for Bτ ,aτ we will need to solve the
following system of linear equations:
∆Cτ aτ + rBτ = V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) (60)
δCτ aτ + rBτ = V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ) (61)
The only solution is:
aτ =
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
Cτ (∆ − δ ) (62)
Bτ =
∆V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ ) − δV (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ )
r (∆ − δ ) (63)
□
Proof of Claim 5. According to Claim 4 and the definition given
in Equation 9, the value of the portfolio at time τ + 1 is:
Φ (τ + 1) = rBτ + aτCτ+1 = V (t ,τ + 1,Cτ+1) (64)
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Recall that the risk-free portfolio constructed in Claim 3 has the
following value at τ + 1:
Φ (τ + 1) = V (t ,τ + 1,Cτ+1) − aτCτ+1 (65)
By isolating the opportunity’s value we get:
V (t ,τ + 1,Cτ+1) = Φ (τ + 1) + aτCτ+1 (66)
Thus, by substituting the above in Equation 64:
Φ (τ + 1) = rBτ + aτCτ+1 = Φ (τ + 1) + aτCτ+1 (67)
Note that the amount of coins in both the portfolio of Claim 4 and
the risk-free portfolio of Claim 3 is identical:
aτ =
V (t ,τ + 1,∆Cτ ) −V (t ,τ + 1,δCτ )
Cτ (∆ − δ ) = aτ (68)
So both can be eliminated from Equation 67, resulting in:
rBτ = Φ (τ + 1) (69)
As the proof of Claim 3 shows, specifically Equation 40, the return
of risk-free portfolio is equal to the risk-free rate:
rBτ = rΦ (τ ) (70)
From the assumption that r , 0, it is possible to divide by it:
Bτ = Φ (τ ) (71)
This equality can be used to replace Bτ in Equation 8, giving:
Φ (τ ) = Φ (τ ) + aτCτ (72)
Substituting for Φ (τ ) by using Equation 34:
Φ (τ ) = V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) − aτCτ + aτCτ (73)
Finally, from Equation 68: aτCτ − aτCτ = 0. We can deduce:
Φ (τ ) = V (t ,τ ,Cτ ) (74)
□
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we argued that widespread notions regarding ASIC
prices and their dependence on cryptocurrency volatility are flawed
and require a different analysis. We have presented a method of
ASIC valuation, and have shown mining hardware can be imitated
using bonds and the underlying cryptocurrencies.
Our evaluation shows that a decrease in Bitcoin’s volatility nega-
tively affects the value of mining hardware, while at the same time
making imitating portfolios cheaper to maintain (smaller adjust-
ments are needed); combined, both negate the financial incentives
put in place to encourage mining. Popular opinion holds that as
Bitcoin becomes more widely used, its volatility will decrease. As
Bitcoin’s security relies on miner participation, lower miner rev-
enues hurt security and undermine Bitcoin’s usage as a currency.
Future Work. To address the security risk inherent in lower
volatility, one possibility is artificially increasing volatility. This
can be done by adopting a random block-reward mechanism: if,
for example, the block reward is made to follow a random walk,
the returns of miners become more volatile thus increasing miner
profits and, as a consequence, participation. By determining re-
wards randomly post-hoc, miners cannot foresee future profits; but,
according to the analysis presented in this work, miners can know
that they have the potential to earn more.
This work has assumed that the global hash-rate is exogenous
to the model, a possible extension could be to endogenize this.
Miners may purchase hardware as long as it remains profitable to
do so. Another interesting extension is to consider mining hardware
capable of mining multiple currencies.
These two additions could allow using our model to estimate
cryptocurrency parameters such as the global-hash rate (and thus,
security relative to other coins) as dependent on the reward and
difficulty adjustment mechanisms of the coin and its competitors,
potentially helping to design better ones that avoid pitfalls like
oscillations and "hash-wars". Additionally, the hash-rate could be
analyzed in relation to the coin’s exchange-rate and electricity price.
As anecdotal evidence shows (see Figure 1), there is a correlation
between these parameters.
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